Visa

2023-11-27 03:43:25

Every company has a story. Learn the playbooks that built the world’s greatest companies — and how you can apply them as a founder, operator, or investor.

NaN
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It's funny, when we picked this episode, I was like, Oh, this is gonna be pretty down

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the middle and easy. And then, of course, as we get into the research, as always, it's

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like, Oh, no, big story here. There's always a story. Who got the truth? Is it you? Is

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it you? Is it you? Who got the truth now? Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Sit me down.

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Say it straight. Another story on the way. Who got the truth? Welcome to Season 13, Episode

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4 of Acquired, the podcast about great technology companies and the stories and playbooks behind

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them. I'm Ben Gilbert. I'm David Rosenthal. And we are your hosts. Today, we tell the

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story of an absolutely incredible system. You can show up anywhere in the entire world

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with a piece of plastic and transact for anything you want in any currency. The merchant doesn't

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need to know you or trust you, and you do not need to know or trust the merchant. And

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Visa, along with just one other competitor, MasterCard, has tirelessly spent decades stitching

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together all the banks, merchants, and the relationships with consumers to make this

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possible. Now, this is just the rosy side of the story, and merchants may harbor far

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less rosy feelings about Visa, given how much of their profits go to interchange fees. But

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the duality of the story is what makes it so interesting to understand. Today, we will

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explore how the whole thing came to be, and try to understand the value that the credit

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and debit card system creates, compared with how much it captures, and by whom, in what

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situations. So here are some astonishing stats on Visa. It is the 11th most valuable company

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in the world. It is worth more than any bank in the world, including every bank involved

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in creating it. Visa's brand is among the very most trusted in the world, associated

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with reliability and security. But that said, if you asked most people what Visa does, they

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could not actually articulate it. Visa does not extend credit. They do not issue cards.

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They do not work directly with merchants. They do not work directly with consumers.

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They are not a bank or a financial institution. They don't ever bear any risk. They are merely

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a network, connecting banks to other banks. David, it is insane.

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This is such an insane story. I can't believe we're all the way in Season 13, and we haven't

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talked about this company yet. But as we will get into, it's always been overlooked and

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underrated.

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Well, perhaps not underrated the last decade or so. If you listeners want to know every

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time an episode drops, you can sign up for email updates at acquired.fm slash email.

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Two new fun things. One, emails now include little hints and some teasers about what next

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episode will be. So if you want to play the guessing game, sign up at acquired.fm slash

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email. And the emails have another new feature. We are including follow-ups from previous

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episodes when we learn new things from you after release.

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Come talk about this episode with us after listening at acquired.fm slash slack. And

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if you want more from David and I outside of these big, long, main Acquired episodes,

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check out ACQ2, our interviews on a second podcast feed. Now, without further ado, this

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show is not investment advice. David and I may have investments in the companies we discuss,

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and this show is for informational and entertainment purposes only. David Rosenthal, where are

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we starting today?

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Well, we are starting actually with a big thank you to Dave Stearns, author of what

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is undeniably the very best book on Visa and its history, Electronic Value Exchange. And

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we owe a thank you to Dave both for writing the book and for talking to us as we researched

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and helping us sift through everything as we're preparing here.

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Fellow Seattleite and the book, which is so wonderfully esoterically named Electronic

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Value Exchange, was his, I think, PhD thesis that they sort of turned into a book.

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Correct.

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All right. Take us back in time.

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So D. Hawk, the founder of Visa, who we will talk a lot about as we go along here, he told

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this great story of how after his time at Visa in his kind of older age, he would start

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his speaking engagements with a little thought exercise for the audience. He would get up

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on stage, he'd hold up his Visa card, and he would ask, how many of you recognize this?

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And of course, every single hand in the room would go up, as I assume all of yours listening

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are going up now, too. Then he would say, okay, now how many of you can tell me who

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owns this company? And every single hand in the room would always go down. And then he

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would say, how did this company start? No hands. Who runs it and who governs it? No

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hands. Where is it headquartered? No hands. It's just wild, as we were saying in the intro,

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how important this company is. And yet still to this day, I think, you know, maybe a few

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more people than in D's time know the answer to these questions, but not many.

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Yeah, it's one of these things, too. It's like one of the only essential pieces of financial

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infrastructure in the United States that has not run out of New York.

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So our task today is to tackle these questions. And we start where some of you I suspect know,

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but the vast majority of you I also suspect don't. We start in 1958 in Fresno, California,

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with The Drop.

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The Drop. This is the name of the title in this fantastic book, A Piece of the Action,

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How the Middle Class Joined the Money Class. And it's chapter one, The Drop, 1958. The

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Drop has become like, if you say The Drop to someone in the fintech industry, they're

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like, oh, September 1958, Fresno.

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Yep. And the rest of the world has no idea.

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Yep.

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All right. So what happened? Well, the then largest bank in America, the San Francisco-based

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Bank of America, which formerly was called the Bank of Italy, both of which were total

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misnomers because it was actually more accurately the Bank of California. It was illegal to

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operate banks across multiple states back then, as we will discuss.

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And the reason it was named Bank of Italy was it was started by an Italian immigrant

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who wanted to create something for the underbanked Italians in his California community.

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Yeah, mostly farmers and merchants in San Francisco. It really started as like the Bank

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of the Little Guy. So Bank of America decides that they are going to mail out little rectangular

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pieces of plastic to every single one of their 65,000 customers in the city of Fresno, completely

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unsolicited.

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Now, a couple of things about this. One, it's wild. I think the Fresno population at this

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point in time was like maybe 200,000, 250,000 people. So like a huge portion of the city

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of Fresno banked with Bank of America. And that was true for all of California at the

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time. Two, they just send these things out. Obviously, these are credit cards. People

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don't know what they are. They have no idea what to use them. Mass chaos ensues.

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Well, and certainly nobody asked for them. There's this great quote, again, from a piece

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of the action that describes it and says, there had been no outward yearning among the

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residents of Fresno for such a device, nor even the dimmest awareness that such a thing

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was in the works. It simply arrived one day with no advance warning as if it had dropped

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out of the sky.

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All right. So to explain how we got here, we need to spend a few more minutes on Bank

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of America's history and the history of banking and payment industries in the U.S. more broadly.

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So like we said, B of A was the biggest bank in America in the 1950s, but it was not like

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all the other big banks at the time. It was a consumer bank. The other large and influential

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banks in America back then were like the J.P. Morgans. They were white shoe corporate banks

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based in New York. We talked about this a lot in the Nike episode. It was illegal for

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banks to operate across state lines until much, much later in history.

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So for banks back then, the only way that you could actually get big for just about

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everybody else in the industry was to go the corporate route and to go the investment

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banking route, because you could service very large corporations that obviously were large

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themselves, would generate lots of deposits, lots of lending activity. The investment banking

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activities around that were obviously very lucrative. That's how the J.P. Morgans, the

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Morgan Stanleys, et cetera, the world came to be.

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For the most part, consumer banks were kind of backwater, small. There was no way to aggregate

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enough customers that you could get big enough.

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Well, and in most states, they would have restrictions on the number of branches that

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banks could actually have. In some states, I think Texas was one of them, you literally

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could only have one branch. Other states would limit them as something like three. Other

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states would limit them and say none outside the city. So you were sort of a bank of a

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city. You could almost think about these more as credit unions than these sort of big banks

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that we think about today.

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California happened to be unique in that you could actually have branches all over the

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state, and California happened to have quite a large population. So it was kind of the

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only place you could pull off a large consumer bank.

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Yes, exactly. California was already the second biggest state in the nation at that time behind

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New York, but the New York banking industry was super fragmented because Bank of America,

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starting as Bank of Italy with all these immigrants, had built up a consumer base.

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They really were unique. So the business of banking is, well, banking. You take deposits,

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you make loans, you make your money on the loans. B of A was doing tons and tons and

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tons of small, little, and disparate consumer loans and lending. So obviously, mortgages

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and car loans, like those still exist today, but they were doing like washing machine loans.

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They were doing like buy now, pay later, but instead of on the website, you would go to

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your local bank branch, you would schedule time, you would sit down with the bank manager,

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and he would authorize you to go spend $150 at some merchant and make you a loan that you would

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come pay back over the next few months in installments. And every single time that you

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wanted to buy something now and pay for it later, you would repeat this very physical,

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one-off manual process.

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Yeah. And for specific items, to like go buy a refrigerator.

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Wild.

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It was just wild to imagine today. So you can see why for a bank like Bank of America that

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is doing this at such large scale, the idea of a consumer credit card, well, it's pretty

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awesome because you can take all of these disparate lending programs, consolidate it

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into just one card, cut out a ton of overhead fees and make it way more efficient. So this

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is what they are launching first in Fresno as the pilot market, and they call it the

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Bank AmeriCard.

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Beautiful name.

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Beautiful name. And it would survive for quite a long time.

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Now, this wasn't exactly a new idea on the part of Bank of America. Charge cards and

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credit cards have been around for decades. What was new was this was the first time that

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a bank had entered this market at scale. So let's talk about the history. Historically

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in the US, transferring money was actually not that easy. You had two options. You could

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use cash or you could use checks. And checks worked, but they also had a bunch of problems.

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One, until the creation of the Federal Reserve in the 1910s, the parties cashing the check,

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receiving the check, didn't actually receive the full face value of the check because there

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was a bunch of work and like mailing stuff around, traveling around the country that

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had to be done. And that was taken as a discount out of the check.

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And this is super important. This thing that we have today, interchange rates on credit

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cards, that was happening with checks too. There was really a lot of expense and risk

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in processing checks when they first got started. And like, of course you would take a discount

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out of the fact that you're taking risk and you're spending money to go and make sure

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that this check that someone handed you eventually turned into dollars that you could have in

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your possession. Totally. So problem number one, you didn't

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get all the money. Right.

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Problem number two, also a big problem. It took a really long time. Imagine, you know,

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we're talking like the 1800s, early 1900s. This stuff was on the Pony Express, you know,

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pieces of paper going around a really, really big country. Not ideal.

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Yeah. And until ACH, where the banks would sort of all meet once a day and decide, okay,

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how much do I owe you? How much do you owe me? In aggregate, okay, let's just settle

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one transaction and then we'll figure out all of our internal accounting ourselves.

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They were literally like check by check and saying, okay, I have this check. So you owe

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me $6.08. Okay, next check. Oh, I owe you $4.20. And it was this crazy system of individual

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couriers bringing checks from the person who gave it to the merchant for the merchant to

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go and track down the money and bring the money back.

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Totally. And spoiler alert, ACH doesn't get developed in the U.S. until the 1970s.

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Wow. Humans, though, are quite ingenious creatures at solving their problems, particularly when

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motivated by money. So there is sort of an obvious solution to this for merchants and

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their sort of usual regular customers. And that is credit accounts, charge accounts.

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Rather than giving me money or a check, let me just keep tabs on a ledger of what you bought,

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what the value is, I'll tab it all up. And then at the end of the month, you'll come give me a

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check or cash for it. I remember even me growing up in the 1980s, we had this at our local gas

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station near our house. Really? We had a credit account. And it was just like, whenever any of

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our family would go to this gas station, we would get the gas. And then we'd go inside and be like,

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oh, we have an account here. And they just write down what it was. And then at the end of the

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month, I assume my dad would go give them some money, which saves on operations for everyone.

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It's oh, great. Now we only need to move money once we move it at the end of the month. And I

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trust you because I've seen you lots. So from charge accounts at individual gas stations or

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individual branches of a grocery store chain or something like that, it's not a leap to think

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the next stage of evolution would be, oh, a card or account that would work at all the branches

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of a given brand. So like the gas stations get into this in a big way. Standard Oil gets into

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this in a big way. Lots of standard stations across the country. You can have an account

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that works at all standard stations. Yep. In 1939, Standard Oil of Indiana

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sent 250,000 unsolicited cards directly to all of their customers.

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Yeah. Making the Fresno drop look like a drop in the bucket, shall we say?

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Well, and interestingly, this is 20 years before. But again, this is not a bank. This is a single

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merchant mailing it out to all of their customers exclusively for use at their facility.

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Yep. So there was that phase. Then pretty quickly in a given local area,

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some of the retailers would get together and be like, you know, we compete with each other,

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but it sucks running these charge account programs on our own. We could collaborate and have a

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standardized charge account system that we could share.

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And just literally to simplify the back office as the first value proposition here.

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Yep. And for consumers, that's also pretty awesome because do you really want to carry

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around 57 different charge cards in your wallet or would you rather have one that would be like,

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you know, your visa to everywhere you want to be? Yes. And not to mention on top of this,

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there is the huge benefit of a shared credit history. Now, all these merchants who were

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losing money on people coming and getting a loan from them in the form of, I'm going to buy some

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goods, I'll pay you back later. But it turns out they had run up a tab all over town and

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weren't paying their bills anywhere. Now with this idea of a shared card, you actually can

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have a shared notion of who a consumer is across locations and across different retailers.

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Yep. So this comes to be kind of post depression in the 1930s, 1940s in the U.S.

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And this really is starting to sound a lot like visa, except as you point out, Ben,

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there is a problem here. As the size of any given network of retailers that are

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collaborating on this grows, so does the intensity of competition within that network.

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So once you get to a certain scale, nobody's really incentivized to keep making this work.

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A, because now you're enabling people to shop all your competitors. But also B, once you get past,

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I don't know, a couple hundred, a thousand participants here, like our individual merchants

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equipped to manage a network like this. No, they don't have the resources to do this.

[00:17:07.57 - 00:17:11.61]

Right. So you have to spin up some kind of like shared organization that all the merchants are

[00:17:11.61 - 00:17:16.69]

pulling their capital into in order to run the network on behalf of all of the merchants. It

[00:17:16.69 - 00:17:24.53]

gets messy. Or there could be an independent third party for profit network that does this.

[00:17:24.53 - 00:17:30.89]

And this is when Diners Club and American Express arrive on the scene. So Diners Club was first,

[00:17:30.99 - 00:17:35.17]

and people might know and have heard of Diners Club. It still exists today. It's like a sub-brand

[00:17:35.17 - 00:17:42.49]

of Discover. Totally. There's a very famous legendary origin story behind Diners Club,

[00:17:42.91 - 00:17:49.31]

and it goes like this. In 1949, you know, post-World War II, economic prosperity,

[00:17:49.31 - 00:17:54.89]

beginning of the Mad Men years in New York and Manhattan, a New York businessman named

[00:17:54.89 - 00:18:01.65]

Frank McNamara is hosting a lavish business dinner in downtown. Halfway through the dinner,

[00:18:02.37 - 00:18:08.49]

he realizes that he forgot his wallet at home. He does not have cash to pay for the dinner.

[00:18:08.83 - 00:18:14.49]

So he excuses himself. He goes to the payphone. He calls his wife at home on Long Island.

[00:18:14.49 - 00:18:20.57]

She speeds into the city with enough cash in time to pay the bill for the dinner. And,

[00:18:20.69 - 00:18:24.89]

you know, face is saved. His reputation as an erudite businessman is preserved.

[00:18:25.11 - 00:18:29.59]

And then afterwards, he's talking to his wife. He's like, oh, there's got to be a better way

[00:18:29.59 - 00:18:36.39]

to do this. There really should be a business person focused charge card network that would

[00:18:36.39 - 00:18:41.51]

work at all the restaurants in Manhattan where business people host dinners. So nobody ever

[00:18:41.51 - 00:18:45.85]

needs to bring their cash. And, you know, you could just imagine that, like, we're all in this

[00:18:45.85 - 00:18:51.37]

club of diners where anywhere we dine, we can stand up. We can authorize the bill. We can leave.

[00:18:51.49 - 00:18:55.85]

We can pay no dollars out of our pocket that moment. And we get one nice statement at the

[00:18:55.85 - 00:19:00.49]

end of the month that, importantly, we do need to pay in full. We cannot roll it over into a loan.

[00:19:00.87 - 00:19:05.19]

We must pay it. But that's nice because all of my business transactions are on one single

[00:19:05.19 - 00:19:10.27]

statement. It's easy for my expense reports. It's easy for me to not have to carry a wallet around.

[00:19:10.27 - 00:19:14.29]

And, of course, I get to look super awesome in front of all of my colleagues.

[00:19:15.09 - 00:19:19.79]

I think there are two really important points here. One, you said I pay it. I don't pay it.

[00:19:19.79 - 00:19:26.07]

My company pays it. You know, I don't care. Two, the most important point, I get to look super

[00:19:26.07 - 00:19:31.23]

awesome in front of all my colleagues and customers and people that I'm trying to impress.

[00:19:31.43 - 00:19:34.67]

I don't need to bring cash. They know me here. I'm good for it.

[00:19:34.99 - 00:19:39.07]

And just to start tracking a certain number here, when we were talking about

[00:19:39.07 - 00:19:43.87]

checks earlier that were getting a discount, and even in this era of early Diner's Club,

[00:19:44.03 - 00:19:49.15]

early American Express, we're talking about a five to seven percent discount of what actually

[00:19:49.15 - 00:19:55.37]

got remitted ultimately to the restaurant or the retailer versus what the bill was

[00:19:55.37 - 00:19:59.61]

originally that the consumer authorized. So all that's a very nice story,

[00:19:59.63 - 00:20:05.75]

except it's completely fabricated. None of that actually happened, although stories like that

[00:20:05.75 - 00:20:11.03]

did play out, I'm sure, on a nightly basis in Manhattan. The reality is Frank just thought

[00:20:11.03 - 00:20:15.85]

this would be a good business idea, and he was right. You know, you see this all the time with

[00:20:15.85 - 00:20:21.99]

networks, network effect businesses. This was the right little node of the network to start with.

[00:20:22.07 - 00:20:27.77]

This was like Harvard and Facebook because restaurants in Manhattan, they're competitive

[00:20:27.77 - 00:20:32.65]

with one another, but it's not exclusive competition. This isn't JC Penney's versus

[00:20:32.65 - 00:20:39.09]

Macy's. No restauranteur in Manhattan, no matter how good they are, really honestly believes that

[00:20:39.09 - 00:20:44.91]

a majority of their customers are only going to dine at their restaurant. Great point. So there's

[00:20:44.91 - 00:20:52.25]

some incentivized sharing. It's almost like the reason to enter into a bundle for your most

[00:20:52.25 - 00:20:56.73]

extreme fans, which are only going to be like the top five percent of your customers. Sure,

[00:20:56.77 - 00:21:01.13]

you want some kind of exclusive relationship and you want to maximize the dollar value you can get

[00:21:01.13 - 00:21:06.35]

out of them, but for your casual fans who like your business but aren't necessarily exclusively

[00:21:06.35 - 00:21:11.89]

going to use your business, you should figure out some kind of bundling system that makes you work

[00:21:11.89 - 00:21:17.41]

with complements of yours so that people can shop you and everything like you with the easiest way

[00:21:17.41 - 00:21:22.11]

possible, and you can still make some money on everybody. You're enabling people to spend money

[00:21:22.11 - 00:21:27.37]

in your restaurant easier and more frequently, and you don't really care that they also go to

[00:21:27.37 - 00:21:31.79]

restaurants because they're going to do that anyway. It's crazy. Like you said, Diner's Club

[00:21:31.79 - 00:21:37.13]

is able to charge restaurants and other merchants. They expand to hotels, airlines, anything that a

[00:21:37.13 - 00:21:43.21]

business person traveler would need. Seven percent of the gross bill. Merchants complain about three

[00:21:43.21 - 00:21:48.83]

percent today. Seven percent. And these are restaurants. That's crazy. Eventually, they have

[00:21:48.83 - 00:21:54.57]

so much power in what they're doing. This product is so good. They also add a fee for the card

[00:21:54.57 - 00:21:59.29]

holders, and it's companies. It's not individual people paying this fee. It's the companies paying

[00:21:59.29 - 00:22:04.67]

this fee. Of course, they're happy to pay it. It enables business. Amazing. Brilliant idea back in

[00:22:04.67 - 00:22:10.33]

the day. And we should say this is pricing power in action to have those very high fees. It's also

[00:22:10.33 - 00:22:17.59]

a necessity. The cost of running these networks in a previous technology generation was super high,

[00:22:17.97 - 00:22:23.23]

and it was not at full scale yet. So it's just operating with a bunch of restaurants and

[00:22:23.23 - 00:22:28.23]

retailers in New York City. So you actually need a lot of people, both because there's not a lot of

[00:22:28.23 - 00:22:32.41]

technology, but you need a lot of people even though there aren't actually a lot of merchants.

[00:22:32.89 - 00:22:39.23]

And so it turns out there's just a lot of cost in the system to run it. And Diner's Club would

[00:22:39.23 - 00:22:43.09]

ultimately fade, although it grows to over a million members. It goes national. It gets acquired

[00:22:43.09 - 00:22:48.87]

by Citibank, then sold to Discover in 2008. As we said, it's still a brand today. But it's basically

[00:22:48.87 - 00:22:55.69]

impossible to create an independent from the ground up network of this at the time because

[00:22:55.69 - 00:23:00.53]

you were just talking about the operational costs of running this thing. Think about the merchant

[00:23:00.53 - 00:23:05.59]

and customer acquisition costs. Nobody knew what Diner's Club was. They have to now go canvas the

[00:23:05.59 - 00:23:11.13]

entire island of Manhattan and ultimately the whole country and world and sign up all of these

[00:23:11.13 - 00:23:16.67]

merchants and go sign up all of these companies to get their employees to use it. That is a very

[00:23:16.67 - 00:23:21.37]

expensive sales proposition. Whereas from this point on, basically everybody else that comes

[00:23:21.37 - 00:23:27.69]

into the industry already has established relationship sales channels into one or both

[00:23:27.69 - 00:23:33.17]

sides of the market, which of course brings us to the brand you're all probably thinking about here,

[00:23:33.65 - 00:23:38.47]

American Express. Which is the Diner's Club of today. It's the favored card by businesses.

[00:23:39.03 - 00:23:45.67]

It is the card that is most used for travel and entertainment and meals.

[00:23:46.43 - 00:23:50.75]

Yep. And so as you might remember from our Berkshire Hathaway series a couple years ago,

[00:23:51.37 - 00:23:55.51]

Amex at this point in time was primarily a traveler's checks business.

[00:23:55.91 - 00:23:56.85]

That's how they started, right?

[00:23:57.31 - 00:24:01.53]

Well, actually, no. They started in 1850. This is amazing. Do you know who started

[00:24:01.53 - 00:24:04.81]

American Express? This is a version of D-Hawk holding up the visa card.

[00:24:04.91 - 00:24:06.63]

Ooh, no, I don't.

[00:24:06.63 - 00:24:11.79]

I did not either until doing research for this episode. It was started by a group of people,

[00:24:12.39 - 00:24:14.81]

two of the most prominent among whom were...

[00:24:14.81 - 00:24:15.29]

Wells and Fargo.

[00:24:15.43 - 00:24:17.21]

Henry Wells and William Fargo.

[00:24:17.59 - 00:24:17.97]

Amazing.

[00:24:18.69 - 00:24:22.91]

Totally amazing. Man, 1850, the Wild West, different time.

[00:24:23.03 - 00:24:28.01]

It was something like they started American Express, but then had a conflict. And so they

[00:24:28.01 - 00:24:30.37]

left and they started Wells Fargo after that.

[00:24:30.81 - 00:24:34.53]

Yeah, something like that. The infrastructure of America was getting built out. So American

[00:24:34.53 - 00:24:38.77]

Express, it's called American Express, it was an express mail company. It was like the

[00:24:38.77 - 00:24:43.39]

Pony Express. That was how they moved stuff around. And I think Wells and Fargo were doing

[00:24:43.39 - 00:24:46.23]

banking. And so obviously banks, as we're talking about, you need to move stuff around

[00:24:46.23 - 00:24:48.33]

the country. It was like a related business.

[00:24:49.05 - 00:24:54.85]

It's amazing. I think it's fascinating that Wells Fargo came after Amex. You think Wells

[00:24:54.85 - 00:24:59.53]

Fargo as this old-timey foundation of America, American Express is even older than that.

[00:24:59.53 - 00:25:05.43]

So Amex, by this point in time, had become a traveler's checks, primarily. That was their

[00:25:05.43 - 00:25:10.67]

primary business. As we talked about on the Berkshire episode, that was a freaking awesome

[00:25:10.67 - 00:25:15.39]

business. Partially because traveler's checks, they made good money. You would buy a $100

[00:25:15.39 - 00:25:20.59]

traveler's check and pay Amex a little fee or whatever. But the float and the breakage,

[00:25:20.73 - 00:25:24.55]

there's traveler's checks out there today that are 50, 100 years old that have never

[00:25:24.55 - 00:25:30.87]

been cashed. And Amex has just been sitting on that cash for decades, investing it. What

[00:25:30.87 - 00:25:31.69]

an amazing business.

[00:25:32.63 - 00:25:37.85]

Okay. So Amex observes Diners Club and says, Hey, we need to get into this. And we actually

[00:25:37.85 - 00:25:40.13]

have an ability to get into this fast.

[00:25:40.23 - 00:25:44.13]

And they actually try to buy Diners Club, but they can't get their own price. And so

[00:25:44.13 - 00:25:48.35]

they're like, Well, we don't need to pay you a lot of money because we can just do

[00:25:48.35 - 00:25:53.11]

this too. And like I was just saying, not only can we do it too, we can do it better

[00:25:53.11 - 00:25:59.83]

than you because we're American Express. We have relationships with companies. We

[00:25:59.83 - 00:26:04.55]

have relationships with restaurants. We have relationships with hotels. We don't need

[00:26:04.55 - 00:26:10.77]

you Diners Club. So just within like a year or maybe even two from when Amex launches

[00:26:10.77 - 00:26:17.59]

their charge card, you know, business traveler program, they sign up 700,000 members, which

[00:26:17.59 - 00:26:21.97]

is almost as much as Diners Club had signed up, you know, many years of working on it.

[00:26:22.61 - 00:26:28.21]

And importantly, here, the thing you're seeing is this is the first time a real financial

[00:26:28.21 - 00:26:34.51]

company is coming into the industry. All of the we know you're good for itness was

[00:26:34.51 - 00:26:40.55]

happening directly from retailers before or by organizations that represented retailers

[00:26:40.55 - 00:26:47.27]

and restaurants. And so now you sort of have not a bank, but a bank like entity that is

[00:26:47.27 - 00:26:49.27]

starting to say, Oh, this could be an interesting business.

[00:26:49.83 - 00:26:57.29]

So this brings us right back to Fresno in 1958, because the timelines match up exactly.

[00:26:57.41 - 00:27:04.27]

This is crazy. Amex launched their charge card program in 1958. B of A sees what's

[00:27:04.27 - 00:27:07.93]

happening. They, of course, had seen everything else going on in the industry before they

[00:27:07.93 - 00:27:13.29]

understand the transformative power that this can have for their scaled consumer banking

[00:27:13.29 - 00:27:18.01]

business in California. And they're like, OK, the time is right. Let's do credit cards.

[00:27:18.01 - 00:27:23.79]

Let's go to Fresno. But hopefully, as we painted the picture, their motivation and

[00:27:23.79 - 00:27:29.99]

Diners Club and Amex and even the merchants and retailers motivations are very different.

[00:27:30.77 - 00:27:35.93]

B of A wants two things out of this. One, like we were saying earlier, they want to

[00:27:35.93 - 00:27:41.51]

streamline and simplify all their wildly diverse lending programs. This is going to be huge

[00:27:41.51 - 00:27:49.25]

operational savings for the bank if they can pull this off. Two, though, the bigger opportunity

[00:27:49.25 - 00:27:56.23]

for B of A is what can this do for our banking business itself? Because remember, how do

[00:27:56.23 - 00:28:05.47]

banks make money? They make money on loans. And this is going to enable so much more effective

[00:28:05.47 - 00:28:09.73]

loan volume to flow through our system that we can make money on.

[00:28:10.33 - 00:28:17.25]

So this is where B of A, informed by their previous business model of lending to consumers,

[00:28:17.97 - 00:28:24.29]

really paves the path of what credit cards would become today. Often in the past, before the Bank

[00:28:24.29 - 00:28:28.91]

AmeriCard, what would happen is you'd have this charge card, not a credit card, and the bill would

[00:28:28.91 - 00:28:33.63]

arrive at the end of the month and then you would pay it. The innovation baked into the Bank AmeriCard

[00:28:33.63 - 00:28:37.73]

is they say, well, after the 30 days, you can get your statement, you can pay it in full, or

[00:28:37.73 - 00:28:44.89]

you can roll it into a loan. And we love loans. We would be happy to extend loans to our customers.

[00:28:45.31 - 00:28:50.63]

We can learn a lot about them. We can make good amount of money on that interest. And so the

[00:28:50.63 - 00:28:55.53]

modern credit card is born. And it was already happening at B of A. They were doing these loans.

[00:28:55.65 - 00:29:01.73]

This wasn't actually like new behavior. It was just a way easier, way more streamlined on-ramp

[00:29:01.73 - 00:29:09.43]

into this consumer lending that turbocharged it. This product is the combination of three things,

[00:29:09.71 - 00:29:16.25]

the charge card that had been happening over in Diners Club, Amex, the gas stations, the

[00:29:16.25 - 00:29:22.85]

retailer land. Then the second pillar is this consumer lending. And the third thing is it is

[00:29:22.85 - 00:29:29.53]

now from a real and proper bank that you already have your primary financial relationship with,

[00:29:29.53 - 00:29:34.79]

not from some industry association or hodgepodge of retailers, but now this is issued by your bank.

[00:29:35.27 - 00:29:39.79]

The big takeaway for Bank AmeriCard is it really bundled two different things together.

[00:29:40.15 - 00:29:45.75]

One was convenience and the other is credit. And there's one more really, really important

[00:29:45.75 - 00:29:53.09]

sub point here to what this loan is. And it relates to the banks and why this is so powerful

[00:29:53.09 - 00:29:57.87]

for B of A and for all banks. Think back to the old way that B of A was doing this.

[00:29:58.59 - 00:30:03.83]

A California homeowner wants to go buy a new refrigerator. They walk into a B of A,

[00:30:04.31 - 00:30:08.23]

talk about it with the lending officer, blah, blah, blah, a bunch of operational costs. Who

[00:30:08.23 - 00:30:14.51]

cares about that? At the end of the process, B of A gives them the money. The money is now out of B

[00:30:14.51 - 00:30:20.01]

of A's hands. It's out the door. The consumer then goes to the merchant and gives the merchant the

[00:30:20.01 - 00:30:26.05]

money and buys the refrigerator. What's happening now with credit cards is actually a little

[00:30:26.05 - 00:30:31.69]

different. The consumer goes to the store, the consumer buys the refrigerator with the credit

[00:30:31.69 - 00:30:39.57]

card. No money has left B of A's hands yet. They get to keep the money. Right. A transaction has

[00:30:39.57 - 00:30:45.39]

been authorized, but yes, they get to keep the money. And because we're talking about California

[00:30:45.39 - 00:30:51.99]

here, there is a very high likelihood chance. And I think at the beginning, I suspect a 100% chance

[00:30:52.55 - 00:30:59.23]

that the merchant also banks with B of A. So that money is never leaving Bank of America's hands,

[00:30:59.43 - 00:31:02.35]

which frees up more capital, which frees up flow, which is just like

[00:31:02.79 - 00:31:06.69]

the B of A management must have been besides themselves with glee about this.

[00:31:07.33 - 00:31:12.45]

Well, in theory, if they managed to put any sort of financial controls or proper risk underwriting

[00:31:12.45 - 00:31:16.47]

on this whole thing, but it turns out, David, as I'm sure you are about to tell us.

[00:31:16.51 - 00:31:17.55]

It's exactly where we're going.

[00:31:17.55 - 00:31:23.49]

When you mail 65,000 cards indiscriminately with the same credit limit to every single customer

[00:31:23.49 - 00:31:28.93]

and say, have at it guys. And this is a brand new consumer behavior that they've heard about,

[00:31:28.97 - 00:31:34.47]

or they might've witnessed in one form or another, but now they have a bona fide charge plus credit

[00:31:34.47 - 00:31:38.11]

card sitting in their hands. You're going to lose a lot of money at first.

[00:31:38.71 - 00:31:44.51]

Yeah. Because there's another more pernicious way that this type of lending is different than the

[00:31:44.51 - 00:31:50.15]

previous type of lending that B of A was doing. It's unsecured. If you give a customer a loan to

[00:31:50.15 - 00:31:54.23]

go buy the refrigerator, you don't want to go repossess the refrigerator, but push comes to

[00:31:54.23 - 00:32:00.45]

shove, you can go repossess the refrigerator. This whole consumer credit card land is unsecured

[00:32:00.45 - 00:32:06.77]

lending. So you probably shouldn't apply the assumptions about your loss ratios from secured

[00:32:06.77 - 00:32:11.95]

lending to unsecured lending, but that is exactly what happened. And this all comes back to why

[00:32:11.95 - 00:32:18.99]

it really had to be bank of America to start this program because they do this, they do the drop in

[00:32:18.99 - 00:32:26.01]

Fresno, 65,000 unsolicited cards go out to unsuspecting consumers. Fraud is out of control.

[00:32:26.25 - 00:32:34.51]

$20 million of fraud within the first pilot program, 22% of the credit that they issued

[00:32:34.51 - 00:32:41.47]

to that initial Fresno cohort ends up being default or delinquent, which I think is like

[00:32:41.47 - 00:32:46.81]

five or six times what their delinquency rate was before on traditional lending.

[00:32:47.69 - 00:32:52.31]

Yeah, it is pretty crazy. So it's worth pointing out, we're talking a lot about credit and debt

[00:32:52.31 - 00:32:58.89]

at this point in time. And now in 2023, some of these kind of sound like bad words. And frankly,

[00:32:58.99 - 00:33:05.27]

it's because of the situation that the society has sort of like push Americans to, but it was

[00:33:05.27 - 00:33:11.77]

very different time back when credit cards were first getting started and when this sort of

[00:33:11.77 - 00:33:17.41]

practice of installment loans was extremely common in the pre-card era. So I want to read, there's a

[00:33:17.41 - 00:33:22.25]

great passage from a piece of the action that I mentioned earlier that I just want to read here.

[00:33:22.99 - 00:33:28.41]

Despite the denunciations, despite the free floating anxiety, Americans have always borrowed

[00:33:28.41 - 00:33:33.61]

money to buy things. If not from a bank, then from somebody, from a finance company or a credit union

[00:33:33.61 - 00:33:38.07]

or a department store or a loan shark for that matter. There isn't another Western country that

[00:33:38.07 - 00:33:44.65]

has relied so heavily on consumer credit. Between 1958 and 1990, there was never a year where the

[00:33:44.65 - 00:33:50.85]

amount of outstanding consumer debt wasn't higher than the year before. Years later, a Bank of

[00:33:50.85 - 00:33:55.11]

America executive could look back on his lifetime in the credit card industry and say proudly,

[00:33:55.49 - 00:34:00.67]

consumer credit built this country. Whatever one's feelings about personal debt is difficult

[00:34:00.67 - 00:34:05.75]

to disagree with this assertion. So interestingly, what's basically happening here is people are

[00:34:05.75 - 00:34:12.13]

using debt not because of this bleak, horrible time that they're in. It's actually because of

[00:34:12.13 - 00:34:17.75]

their optimism. They believe that the future is brighter than the present and so they're fine

[00:34:17.75 - 00:34:24.17]

taking on debt. And that is sort of what has sort of led us to today, where because the growth of

[00:34:24.17 - 00:34:29.87]

the American economy and the global economy has been so strong, people have always generally been

[00:34:29.87 - 00:34:34.59]

fine, or at least we exist in a system that teaches you you should kind of be fine betting

[00:34:34.59 - 00:34:40.79]

that the future is going to be better than today. Such a good point. As long as growth is happening

[00:34:40.79 - 00:34:48.81]

in an economy, a society, industry, whatever, you should absolutely use capital to fuel into that

[00:34:48.81 - 00:34:53.85]

growth. Yep. And that may not be true on an individual basis, but it is absolutely true on a

[00:34:53.85 - 00:34:59.01]

societal basis. Yep. So back to what I was saying about why B of A is so important. B of A can

[00:34:59.01 - 00:35:05.69]

absorb this loss. No other consumer bank at the time, if they had seen $20 million of losses in

[00:35:05.69 - 00:35:10.05]

like a set of months, they would have pulled the ripcord immediately. B of A, though, they can

[00:35:10.05 - 00:35:16.51]

absorb this loss, no problem. And they know if we can make this work, this is going to transform

[00:35:16.51 - 00:35:25.63]

our business. So rather than pulling the ripcord, they expand. They roll it out quickly across

[00:35:25.63 - 00:35:32.75]

the whole rest of California. Over the next year, all within the first year, they sign up 20,000

[00:35:34.15 - 00:35:38.23]

merchants in California and get this. Do you know how many cardholders they sign up in that first

[00:35:38.23 - 00:35:48.09]

year? No. 2 million California cardholders signed up using the card in the first year. It took Diners

[00:35:48.09 - 00:35:53.15]

Club years to get to a million. Amex was so proud in the first year or two, they get to 700,000.

[00:35:53.71 - 00:36:01.85]

B of A instantly, at scale, is the largest charge card, credit card program, certainly in America,

[00:36:02.63 - 00:36:09.89]

I suspect in the world. And that's one year and one state. This is like meta launching threads

[00:36:09.89 - 00:36:15.59]

or Microsoft launching teams. You can sort of sit back for a while and watch the innovation and

[00:36:15.59 - 00:36:21.01]

figure out what the very best product is that people want. And then you can go ram it through

[00:36:21.01 - 00:36:25.13]

your distribution channels when you invent one of your own. And it's even more than that. As we

[00:36:25.13 - 00:36:30.73]

said, this really was a big innovation. It wasn't just that they copied Amex and Diners Club or

[00:36:30.73 - 00:36:36.87]

anything else. They were adding credit to this. This was a huge innovation. So by 1961, year three

[00:36:36.87 - 00:36:42.93]

of the program, they're able to get fraud under control enough that the whole program is profitable.

[00:36:43.61 - 00:36:47.17]

But they keep that under their hats. Yes. They don't want anybody else to know about this.

[00:36:47.17 - 00:36:51.33]

So there's been all these newspaper articles about all this money that B of A is losing.

[00:36:51.55 - 00:36:56.29]

So many banks that had been thinking about launching a similar program abandoned it because

[00:36:56.29 - 00:37:00.51]

they were like, oh, man, we thought this was going to work, but clearly it's not working for B of A.

[00:37:00.59 - 00:37:05.59]

So people were shutting down their efforts. There was rumors that another bank was going to launch

[00:37:05.59 - 00:37:10.97]

in L.A., in San Francisco. And B of A had actually rushed theirs to market to go be sooner than these

[00:37:10.97 - 00:37:16.33]

other banks that actually never ended up launching because the market perception was that it was

[00:37:16.33 - 00:37:24.49]

such a gigantic failure. Here's a crazy stat. From 1960 to 1966. So this whole era is actually

[00:37:24.49 - 00:37:30.99]

a profitable era for B of A, but no one else knows it. There were only 10 new credit cards

[00:37:30.99 - 00:37:36.89]

introduced in the entire United States because they did such a good job keeping what became

[00:37:36.89 - 00:37:44.59]

a cash gusher for them quiet. But secret comes out in 1966. And from 1966 to 1968, just two years,

[00:37:44.59 - 00:37:51.03]

approximately 440 credit cards were introduced by banks large and small throughout the country.

[00:37:51.91 - 00:37:58.69]

Yes. And it is specifically 1966 when the secret gets out because phase two of Bank of America's

[00:37:58.69 - 00:38:06.03]

grandmaster plan here gets unveiled, which is maybe worth a quick setup. As we said,

[00:38:06.11 - 00:38:10.95]

this was transformative for their business in California, but they're the biggest bank in

[00:38:10.95 - 00:38:18.21]

and they have been itching for any kind of way to expand to truly be the Bank of America. Like,

[00:38:18.29 - 00:38:21.61]

why the hell did they change the name to Bank of America? It's not because they wanted to be

[00:38:21.61 - 00:38:27.95]

the Bank of California. So they're like, maybe this is our path. And California is only like

[00:38:27.95 - 00:38:36.47]

10% of the U.S. population. In 1966, they create the Bank Americard Service Organization

[00:38:37.43 - 00:38:46.85]

with the express purpose of licensing out the Bank Americard program and network to banks across

[00:38:46.85 - 00:38:53.69]

the country, across all 50 states. And this is the seed of Visa. But listeners, before we talk

[00:38:53.69 - 00:39:00.21]

about how the Bank Americard Licensing Association morphs into Visa, now is the perfect time to tell

[00:39:00.21 - 00:39:05.17]

you about one of our favorite companies, Blinkist and their new parent company, Go One, where David

[00:39:05.17 - 00:39:11.59]

and I are proud angel investors. Yes, Blinkist, as you know, takes books and condenses them into

[00:39:11.59 - 00:39:16.01]

the most important points so you can read or listen to the summaries. It's great if your job,

[00:39:16.15 - 00:39:20.45]

unlike ours, isn't just to sit around and read books all day, but you still want the amazing

[00:39:20.45 - 00:39:25.49]

insights. So as Blinkist has been doing throughout the season, they are creating blinks of our

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research books for each episode and making them available to you all for free. You can find our

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material for this episode, including Dave's awesome book and D. Hawk's memoir, one for many

[00:39:35.89 - 00:39:42.35]

at Blinkist.com slash Visa. Yep. And they have also created something very cool that I never

[00:39:42.35 - 00:39:48.59]

thought anyone would ask for from us. They created a page that represents David and my bookshelves.

[00:39:48.69 - 00:39:52.63]

So if you want to read our favorite books broadly, having nothing to do with this episode,

[00:39:52.69 - 00:39:56.93]

but like literally what's behind me on that bookshelf that I feel are kind of our trophies

[00:39:56.93 - 00:40:02.19]

from all the episodes that we have researched, you can go to Blinkist.com slash acquired and look

[00:40:02.19 - 00:40:08.35]

at Ben and David's bookshelf and you can get those for free. So beyond that, Blinkist is always giving

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acquired listeners an exclusive 50% discount on all their premium content, which is really great

[00:40:13.79 - 00:40:18.19]

stuff. All these summaries and especially the audio summaries of really important books.

[00:40:18.79 - 00:40:24.11]

Yeah. So many of you may be wondering why is Blinkist giving such an awesome deal to the

[00:40:24.11 - 00:40:28.41]

acquired community? I don't say that tongue in cheek. It really is. The reason is that GoOne,

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where we're investors in which acquired them this year, is an amazing corporate learning and

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development content platform that if you're a L&D manager, a team lead, or a founder, which obviously

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many of you are, you should absolutely go check out. GoOne is the one subscription, one billing,

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So this is HR trainings, specific skillset development classes, everything you need

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across your whole company. They're the leader in the space. They're just an awesome company

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that you should definitely work with if you are not already. Yep. Our huge thanks to Blinkist

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and GoOne. Go take advantage of all this free content by clicking the link in the show notes.

[00:41:11.49 - 00:41:18.15]

Okay, David. So how do we get to Visa? You have been telling me about the BankAmericard from Bank

[00:41:18.15 - 00:41:22.93]

of America, and I opened this show saying Visa's not a bank, and Visa doesn't have direct

[00:41:22.93 - 00:41:27.57]

relationships. It's this big indirect thing where they work with other banks. This is a big mismatch.

[00:41:28.33 - 00:41:35.19]

This story is so wild because this first chapter that we just told, there's only one entity in

[00:41:35.19 - 00:41:40.83]

the world that could have done this, Bank of America. In this second chapter, there is also

[00:41:40.83 - 00:41:46.41]

only one person in the world that could have taken BankAmericard and turned it into Visa,

[00:41:46.41 - 00:41:54.71]

and that is DHOC. So here we are in 1966. B of A now starts going around to all the other

[00:41:54.71 - 00:42:00.59]

consumer banks in other states and selling them on joining the network as BankAmericard

[00:42:00.59 - 00:42:09.13]

licensees. And the deal is that you pay B of A a $25,000 franchise fee to get your franchise of

[00:42:09.13 - 00:42:13.99]

the BankAmericard. This is like a Wendy's or something. Plus then you pay them a percentage

[00:42:13.99 - 00:42:19.91]

of the gross transaction revenues. It literally is like a McDonald's. This is wild. I mean,

[00:42:20.07 - 00:42:26.11]

I get the executives must have just been throwing party after party because A, this whole thing

[00:42:26.11 - 00:42:30.63]

turbocharged their own business. B, now they're like, oh, we're going to make all the other

[00:42:30.63 - 00:42:34.85]

consumer banks in the country essentially into like serfs on our kingdom here.

[00:42:35.49 - 00:42:39.25]

Right. And one of the assumptions they made was correct, and the other one was too hubris.

[00:42:39.25 - 00:42:44.73]

The first assumption is a good business model decision, which is, okay, we've now created this

[00:42:44.73 - 00:42:50.59]

distributed asset, which is all these customers with our card that want to use our card at lots

[00:42:50.59 - 00:42:54.95]

of merchants. People still weren't using credit cards the way we do today, just treating it like

[00:42:54.95 - 00:42:58.99]

cash and using it for coffees and little things here and there. It was still sort of treated as

[00:42:58.99 - 00:43:04.71]

this is the card for big purchases, some of which I may want to finance and decide later.

[00:43:04.71 - 00:43:10.61]

It was also an intensely private thing, kind of taboo thing, right? Because when you were using

[00:43:10.61 - 00:43:15.65]

a credit card in these days, you were implicitly saying, I'm using debt to buy this transaction.

[00:43:16.21 - 00:43:18.69]

And so you didn't want other people to necessarily know that.

[00:43:19.23 - 00:43:24.59]

Right. It's a bit odd, but consumers clearly did want to use this thing for some subset of

[00:43:24.59 - 00:43:28.61]

the purposes that they did today. And so Bank of America is kind of leaning into it and saying,

[00:43:28.61 - 00:43:35.33]

we've got this asset, surely we can leverage that for great gain. But the specific implementation

[00:43:35.33 - 00:43:39.67]

of it was a bad assumption where they said the way that we can take advantage of the fact that

[00:43:39.67 - 00:43:43.19]

now all these consumers have the card and all these merchants out there and accept the card

[00:43:43.19 - 00:43:47.11]

is this weird franchising thing. Well, the bad assumption was that

[00:43:47.11 - 00:43:52.01]

other banks would consent to basically being serfs in their kingdom.

[00:43:52.55 - 00:43:54.83]

Yes. But at the outset,

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